1 There are at least two debates on what a context is. One concerns how structured it is and what elements it contains: is it a set of worlds (Stalnaker (1978 (Stalnaker ( , 1998 )) or something that has many elements, including a set of worlds, set of salient elements, questions under discussion etc. (and are these elements ranked or ordered) ( Lewis (1979) , Roberts (1984) ). The other debate is whether contexts are subjective mental representations (Hamm, Kamp and Lambalgen (2006) ) or objective abstract objects (Steedman and Stone (2006) ; Devault and Stone (2006, Ch.2) . 2 For a dissenting view, see Ludlow (1999) sensitivity in natural language beyond whatever is introduced by the 'easy' examples of context sensitive expressions discussed in §1. Between the radicals and the minimalists sit a variety of moderate contextualist positions.
[3] Objections to Radical Contextualism
It would be accepted by everyone that (16) is context sensitive, because it contains the demonstrative "these":
(16) These leaves are green.
We could say that (16) has no truth conditions independently of context. However, most philosophers would say that an adequate semantic theory for English would provide us with a generalisation of the form:
Relative to a context c, (16) is true iff ____
that is, a generalisation which tells us the truth condition of (16) relative to an arbitrary context. One's first guess might be:
(16*) Relative to a context c, "These leaves are green" is true iff the objects indicated in c are green leaves. This is perhaps a little crude, but it is usually thought that semanticists should seek generalisations of roughly this kind. However, radical contextualists, motivated by arguments like that given in [2.5] , deny that such generalisations like this could capture the subtle and multifarious ways in which the truth conditions of English sentences depend on context. As Bezuidenhot elegantly puts it:
What is expressed by the utterance of a sentence in a context goes beyond what is encoded in the sentence itself. Truth-conditional content depends on an indefinite number of unstated background assumptions, not all of which can be made explicit. A change in background assumptions can change truth-conditions, even bracketing disambiguation and reference assignment. That is, even after disambiguating any ambiguous words in a sentence and assigning semantic values to any indexical expressions in the sentence, truth-conditions may vary with variations in the background. (Bezuidenhout 2002, p. 105) This, then, is the negative claim characteristic of radical contextualism. Problems arise, however, when radical contextualists get around to defining their views positively. In particular, it is difficult for radical contextualists to answer the question, What does it take for an utterance of (16) to be true? Here is Travis struggling with this question:
What could make the given words "The leaves are green" true, other than the presumed "fact that the leaves are green," is the fact that the leaves counted as green on the occasion of that speaking. Since what sometimes counts as green may sometimes not be, there may still be something to make other words "The leaves are green" false, namely that on the occasion of their speaking, those leaves (at that time) did not count as green. (Travis, 1997b, pp.101-02; see, also, Travis, 1996, p. 457) This passage suggests an utterance of (16) can be true even when the indicated leaves aren't green, because they might still count as green. Apparently, as Travis sees it, the indicated leaves can count as green even if they aren't. This should seem strange all by itself, but the key critical point we want to register is that in saying this Travis has actually contradicted the central claim of his radical contextualism. It would seem that on Travis's view, something like the following is true:
(16 Travis ) Relative to a context c, "These leaves are green" is true iff the objects indicated in c count as green leaves in c.
But this is exactly the sort of generalisation which radical contextualists claim to be impossible! A second inconsistency charge against radical contextualism arises from Travis's answer to the question: "What, other than the indicated leaves' being green, could ever suffice for the truth of and utterance of (16) (17) What could make the given words "The leaves are green" true, other than the presumed "fact that the leaves are green," is the fact that the leaves counted as green on the occasion of that speaking.
are determined (in part) by what counts as green in MC, i.e., the semantic contribution of the expression "green" as it occurs in an utterance of (17) (17 MC ) What could make the given words "The leaves are green" true, other than the presumed "fact that the leaves are green," is the fact that the leaves counted as green mc on the occasion of that speaking.
We hope it is clear this is not what Travis intends to be saying. He doesn't mean to suggest that the leaves counting as green mc is what would make an utterance of "The leaves are green" true in contexts other than MC (and (17) is clearly about contexts other than MC.) The bottom line is that he seems to be trying to use "green" as it occurs in (17) in a context insensitive way. Since, according to him, such context insensitive uses are not possible, it follows that (17) either says something false (i.e., that counting as green mc is what makes utterances of "the leaves are green" true in contexts other than MC) or it employs the word "green" in a way inconsistent with radical contextualism. (The same point applies to our use of "green" on the RHS of (16 Travis ), (and, for that matter, for our attempt to formulate this objection).)
In short, if these arguments are sound, then radical contextualism has provided no coherent alternative to the standard picture. We turn now to more systematic ways of distinguishing context-sensitive expressions from those which are insensitive to context. In this next section, we will canvass a number of tests for context sensitivity: that is, procedures for identifying context-sensitive expressions.
[4] Tests for Context-Sensitivity
In §2, we explored a variety of arguments for the view that context sensitivity in natural language extends well beyond the easy examples we discussed in §1. All of these arguments are more or less controversial. Moreover, taken together they push us towards radical contextualism -a position we have seen is inherently untenable. In both tests (and others; cf. Cappelen and Lepore (2005)), it is presumed that accurate reporting requires reporter and reportees to be expressing the same thought (or proposition) when the latter's utterances easily admit of a disquotational or collective indirect report.
[4.3] Agreement Tests (Agree)
Notice that on the indirect reporting tests it is not at all obvious that expressions like 'immigrate', 'left', 'nearby', 'it's raining', 'local', 'heavy', and 'ready' fail to satisfy IDR and Collectivity. For example, an utterance of (18) In short: if speakers in distinct contexts utter S, but can be reported as agreeing, then S is context insensitive; and if one utters S while the other utters its negation, then S is context sensitive only if they needn't disagree.
One reason for preferring agreement judgments over indirect reporting ones in ascertaining context sensitivity is that the former do not admit of distributive readings while the latter may. Agreement and disagreement require co-ordination on a single proposition, while indirect reporting does not. We can associate with the demonstrative type word "this" a function, which takes a context as argument and yields the object indicated, or otherwise rendered most salient, in the context. Each token of "this" then refers to the value of the function evaluated at the relevant context. Now for some terminology: The content of a token expression is its semantic interpretation in its particular context. The character of a type expression is a function which maps each context to the appropriate content.
Notice that even non-context-sensitive expressions can be said to have characters -in such cases the character is a constant function. Notice also that whole sentences have characters. The character of the sentence "I was hungry yesterday," for example, is a function which maps each context c to the proposition that the speaker at c was hungry on the day before the time of c. The terms "content" and "character" come from David Kaplan, who introduced this way of dealing with context sensitivity. 8 This approach to accommodating context-sensitivity is standard for dealing with all of the uncontroversial cases of context-sensitivity, as discussed in §1. Other (putative) sorts of context sensitivity must be treated differently, as we shall see.
[6] Unarticulated Constituents
We now return to an example discussed in section [2.4]. Consider: 
206)
According to this passage, if we fail to add a location to what's expressed by an utterance of (22) we lack something truth evaluable, i.e. we don't have a proposition. Plausibly, then, (22) is context sensitive. In some contexts, it expresses the proposition that it is raining in Palo Alto; in another it expresses the proposition that it is raining in Paris. Not everyone will agree that (22) is context sensitive in this way, but let's put that question to the side, and instead ask how to explain this sort of context sensitivity, on the assumption that it exists.
Is Perry right that there is no word in (22) which has a non-constant character? "Rain" is the only good candidate, and it seems that the theory will have to go something along these lines: 8 Kaplan 1989a 8 Kaplan , 1989b The word "rain", when used in a context c, refers to the property of raining at the location contextually salient at c.
When one uses (22) in a context in which the contextually salient location is Palo
Alto, (22) will express the proposition that it is raining in Palo Alto. On the other hand, when one uses (22) in a context in which the salient location is Paris, it will express a different proposition. So far, so good -the theory seems to work well.
One problem for this approach arises when we consider statements like:
(23) It is raining in Palo Alto.
Suppose we use (23) in a context c in which the salient location is Paris. Then the content of "rain" in c will be the property of raining in Paris. But then, on the proposed theory, the token of (23) would appear to express the proposition that it is raining in Paris, and it is unclear how "in Palo Alto" could play a role in determining the proposition expressed. Something has clearly gone wrong! There are various strategies for "fixing up" the proposal, but as far as we know it cannot be fixed in a way that is plausible without violating compositionality.
So it seems that we need an alternative to the standard content/character approach. Here is a natural proposal: The underlying relation here is Rain(t,l) -which holds when it is raining at t in l. (22) specifies one of the arguments for this relation (the "t" argument) but no syntactic constituent of (22) refers to a location, so the second argument is left, as it were, blank. The sentence, therefore, expresses an incomplete proposition, a proposition with a hole in it (a "propositional radical", as Kent Bach puts it): 9 (24) Rain (1 st September 1996,_) Different tokens of (22) express different propositions because this propositional radical gets "filled in" in different ways in different contexts.
On this view, (22) expresses the propositional radical (24), but a particular token of (22) could express the proposition:
(25) Rain(1 st September 1996, Palo Alto)
Some part of what is asserted in such a case does not correspond to a syntactic constituent of the sentence used to make the assertion. It is, as one says, 9 Bach (1994) "unarticulated" (cf. Perry 1986). It is somehow, in away never made clear in the literature, "introduced" into the proposition expressed without any direction from the uttered sentence.
[7] Binding Arguments and Hidden Indexicals
A number of critics have challenged the idea of an unarticulated constituent; in particular, they invoke the so-called binding argument for their critical support of the idea that every object in the proposition expressed is put there by an expression in the sentence uttered. We begin with an example.
Consider:
(26) Wherever John visits, it's raining.
On its most natural reading, (26) expresses the proposition that for any location x that John visits, it's raining at x. On this reading, some sort of quantification is going on. A natural thought here is that where there is quantification there must be variable binding. Accordingly, the adverbial phrase "Whenever John visits" is a quantificational phrase, binding a variable in the part of (26) that follows the comma. On this view, the variable does not correspond to any pronounced component of the sentence, but just the same it must be there. It might seem strange to say that there are syntactic components of sentences which are not pronounced, but in fact this is routine in modern syntax.
10
But what has this got to with context sensitivity? Hold onto the idea that "rain" is followed by an unpronounced variable, and look again at (22): (22) It is raining.
According to the view under discussion, consideration of (26) shows that (22) contains an unpronounced variable. But in the case of (22) there is no quantificational expression that could bind this variable, and so it occurs free.
Since it occurs free, its interpretation is fixed contextually. Roughly, in any context of use, the variable will refer to whichever place is most salient in that context of use. On this view, then, the variable in (22) behaves like an indexical (i.e. like "this" or "that"). Because it is not pronounced, it is called a "hidden indexical". Theories of this kind are called "hidden indexical theories".
10 See any introductory syntax textbook for examples.
It has been argued, perhaps most notably by Stanley and Szabo (2000) , 11 that unarticulated constituents theories of (22) (as discussed in the last section)
cannot be extended to cope with sentences like (26). If this is right, it provides an argument for hidden indexical theories over unarticulated constituent theories.
12
It is perhaps worth pausing to draw attention to the key difference between the unarticulated constituents approach and the hidden indexical approach. Both theories agree that (22), uttered in a certain context, will express the proposition that it is raining in Palo Alto, and both theories agree that no pronounced component of (22) refers to Palo Alto. The big difference is that the hidden indexical theory says that there is a component of (22) that refers to Palo Altoan indexical expression which is present in the syntax but not pronouncedwhile the unarticulated constituents theory denies that there is a component of (22) -even a hidden component -which refers to Palo Alto.
[8] The Dynamic Lexicon
It is not uncommon for language users to coin new words "on the fly," or to invent new meaning for old words. Clark (1983) gives many examples, including these:
Subjected to the musical equivalent of 72 hours in a dentist's waiting room, Bradley was apparently in real danger of being the first tourist ever
Muzakked to death. (From the San Francisco Examiner)
I think that it's across from a quarry. That's the only way I can landmark it.
(Said by a person talking about finding a beach).
I stopped in Perry's for a quick crab. (Herb Caen, meaning a crab that could be eaten quickly)
Examples like these suggest that we should not think that language users just select their words from a fixed lexicon; rather, the lexicon can be modified and extended in the course of conversation. As Ludlow (2000) puts it, the lexicon is dynamic.
example, that there is a shift in which set of epistemic standards are salient between the two contexts. However, it is notorious that claims like First lead to problems. Suppose one has a sequence of suitcases. The first weighs 1kg, the last weighs 100kg, and adjacent suitcases in the sequence differ in weight by only 1g. By repeated application of First, one can derive a contradiction from the innocuous assumption that the first suitcase is not heavy and the last is, and the assumption that adjacent bags in the sequence differ only slightly in weight.
Contextualists about vagueness, recalling that there are independent grounds for thinking that 'heavy' is context-sensitive (see §2.2), offer a principle like this in place of First:
Second: In a given context, given any two contextually salient objects that differ only slightly in weight, either both objects are in the extension of "heavy" in the context or neither is.
To put it roughly, the line that divides heavy things from not-heavy things moves around so that it never lies between two objects that are contextually salient and very similar in weight. The reason why it is improper for me to assert (14) is that both of the suitcases are contextually salient, and they differ only slightly in weight.
The theory is attractive because it rejects First (which leads to contradiction) and also offers an explanation of why First is so attractive. Vague predicates appear to be "boundaryless" 16 because the boundary moves in such a way that it never lies between two contextually salient objects. Wherever you look, there it isn't. Option Three: (30) fails to express a proposition; it lacks a truth-condition.
Prima facie, options one and two are inconsistent, as are options two and three.
It turns out that it is difficult to adopt one of these options and then stick with it despite further thought. Whichever option one chooses, one will find oneself inclined to move to a different one.
One might begin by reasoning as follows:
Suppose, for contradiction, that the sentence ' (30) [10] Summary
• Some words -including "I", "this", "current" and "today" -are uncontroversially context-sensitive.
• It is controversial how far context-sensitivity extends beyond these 'easy' examples.
• At one extreme, minimalists argue that the only context-sensitivity in natural language is that introduced by the 'easy' examples. At the other extreme, radical contextualists argue that examples of contextsensitivity are so widespread and multifarious that they cannot be accounted for by a systematic semantic theory.
• Radical contextualist positions are hard to state coherently (see §[3]), and are at any rate refuted by the tests for context-sensitivity (see §[4]). 18 The two classic papers advocating contextualist approaches to the liar paradox are Burge (1979) and Parsons (1974) . Our summary is enough, we hope, to give the reader the barest hint of the motivation for such approaches. For a more satisfying discussion, and further references, the reader is encouraged to look at Beall and Glanzberg (Forthcoming).
• • It has been argued that postulating context-sensitivity can help us with the liar paradox and the sorites paradox, and that it can be a useful part of a response to scepticism in epistemology. 19 The 'hidden indexical' approach is perhaps best seen as a special case of the character/content approach, but for ease of exposition we have separated them.
